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SOVIET OPTIONS IN THE PACIFIC1 
Gerald SEGAL 
Imagine the Soviet Union's dream of its future position in 
the Pacific. If Soviet domestic reform proceeds well, if the 
massive investment plan in the Far East attracts a flood of new 
immigrants from European Russia, and if the Soviet storehouse 
of raw materials are exploited and processed, the Soviet Union 
could conceivably become a major market for other members of 
the Pacific as well as a major supplier of commodities. Light 
industrial products from China and the Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) could vastly improve the quality of life in the 
Soviet Far East, if the natural regional trade is allowed to 
flourish in the atmosphere of domestic Soviet reforms and 
reduced international military tension. Japan could join in 
multilateral economic ventures with the Communist states of 
northeast Asia and could also be a primary investor in joint 
ventures and the special export processing zones in the Soviet 
Pacific territories. The NICs and the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) could also buy Soviet commodities and 
invest in new Soviet projects. Socialist East Asia could be 
revitalized, and Vietnam, in particular, could begin to undercut 
the price of Chinese light industrial products. Moscow may 
even develop new friends among Pacific islanders, if the Soviet 
Union's international mining and fishing industries grow and 
prosper. Soviet military power will probably remain strong in 
the region, but as Japan and China grow more powerful and 
independent, the Soviet Union will appear less threatening. In 
addition, if trade and industries flourish, there will be little 
incentive for any nation to disturb the peace of the Pacific. 
While such a scenario may not be possible in the near future, 
the Soviet Union today is more likely than ever before to 
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become a Pacific power. Rapid advancements in the Soviet 
Pacific during the twenty-first century are doubtful, but 
important changes in Soviet policy are already underway. 
Although great changes have not yet been made, reform is 
taking place. Analyzing these marginal reforms is useful-they 
reflect the Soviet Union's new priorities in the Pacific. 
A. NEW THINKING 
New trends in the Pacific and new Soviet thinking about the 
region did not begin with Mikhail Gorbachev, although his July 
1986 speech in Vladivostok is the predictable starting point for 
nearly every analysis of Soviet policy in the Pacific during the 
past several years 2 . It is now abundantly clear that the Soviet 
Union is indeed thinking more positively about the Pacific, 
especially about East Asia. Even Andrei Gromyko, notorious as 
the Soviet foreign minister who ignored the Pacific, indicated a 
new shift to a Soviet east-oriented strategy in February 1988 3 . 
To a large extent, the Soviet Union is merely reacting belatedly 
to Pacific thinking that has already been well understood in the 
capitalist world, and more recently even in China. From the 
Soviet point of view, the need for changes in its Pacific policy 
comes from the recognition of at least six major trends. 
1. The Failing Soviet Far East 
A considerable portion of the much-quoted Vladivostok 
speech was devoted to Gorbachev's most basic problem in the 
Pacific -- the failure of the Soviet Far East to meet even the 
faltering pace of the overall Soviet economy. To be understood, 
the problems of this region must be analyzed in the larger 
context of determining how a socialist state economy can be 
reformed. 
The implications of reform for Soviet Pacific policy require 
some elaboration. There was an urgent requirement to reassess 
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the Soviet ability to sustain major military spending in an age of 
declining growth rates. Thus it was necessary to create a 
breathing space, where, in a style reminiscent of Deng 
Xiaoping, reform could be shaped and tough choices about 
resource allocation made. Military spending had to be 
restrained and international tensions minimized. 
In addition, if the Soviet Union were serious about its 
Pacific potential it would need to divert resources to build an 
infrastructure in the region or entice foreign investment. To 
integrate the Soviet Far East into the booming international 
economy of the Pacific it was necessary to attract people and 
jobs. Moscow had made some decisions about the Soviet Far 
East, but Soviet leaders were still a long way from forming a 
coherent plan. 
The Soviets decided to embark on yet another massive 
investment plan. The August 1987 plan for the Soviet Far East 
to the year 2000 suggested that up to $359 billion would be spent 
on the region. One of the key failures in the Soviet economy has 
been the inability to realize its potential in the Pacific. For 
example, only 2,150 kilometers of the Baikal-Amur Railway's 
(BAM) total 3,095 kilometers were open to regular traffic in 
1988, and only 12 of the 46 settlements along the line had been 
completed. The line is not expected to be fully operational for 
some years to come. Yet even operating at only one quarter 
capacity, the BAM was still profitable because of the central 400 
kilometer sector that was being used constantly 4. 
The planned Soviet economic reforms concentrated mainly 
on intensive restructuring, which meant concentrating on 
existing areas of industrial development and drawing on Soviet 
investment. Yet some aspets of the plan, and most of the ideas 
developed in 1988 and after, suggested a more maritime 
orientation that looked outside the Soviet Union for investment 
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and even ideas. Oil, natural gas, coal, timber, and fish would be 
sold as raw materials or as processed commodities, with 
investment and markets found mainly in the booming Pacific. 
The Soviet Far East would have an increased population to 
implement these tasks; to this end, living conditions would be 
improved and 30 percent of investment would be on 
infrastructure 5 . In devising this plan, it is not clear that the 
planners had resolved differences between emphasizing foreign 
involvement or internal funding6. The debate about making the 
Soviet Far East a more separate zone linked to East Asia or one 
more strictly controlled from Moscow has deep roots in modern 
Soviet history. Indeed, the failure to establish a separate zone 
casts serious doubt on the long-term future of a successful 
"look-east" policy for the Soviet Union. But the Soviet debate 
on the best way to develop the Far East, and the new 
regulations on joint ventures, suggested that the Soviet Far 
East may well be given greater freedom to pursue its own 
distinctive policy in the Pacific. 
2. New Chinese Pragmatism 
China's challenge to the Soviet Union used to be perceived 
in Moscow in ideological and military terms, but the obvious 
success of new Chinese pragmatism under Deng made the 
challenge one of reform. China demonstrated that reform of 
state socialism was possible and that retaining a socialist 
character while achieving rapid economic gains was also 
possible. China's opening up to the international capitalist 
economy, its bold new ventures in special export zones, and the 
restructuring of economic ideology suggested that socialist 
economies could obtain major benefits from the capitalist 
system. 
This new Chinese pragmatism also led to a reduced Soviet 
threat perception and opened the door to improved Sino-Soviet 
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relations. Thus possibilities were enhanced for reducing Soviet 
defense spending, developing greater cross-border economic 
cooperation, and learning from Chinese reform experiments. 
China's greater foreign policy independence reduced Soviet 
fears of a Sino-Japanese-American alliance. With a lowered 
perception of the Soviet threat fostered by China, the Soviet 
Union was better able to convince the Pacific states of its 
peaceful intentions. 
3. The Rise of Japan 
If the rise of a more independent China created a great 
power triangle, the rise of Japan as an economic superpower 
created some elements of a great power quadrilateral. The 
Pacific showed differences from European bipolarity, especially 
as military conflicts declined and economic power became more 
important. Although Japan continued to rely on the United 
States for defense, by the late 1980's under American pressure, 
Japan's defense spending had become the third highest in the 
world (after that of the superpowers). As China began to 
complain that a more independent Japan might also be a 
militarily stronger Japan, the Soviet Union began to realize that 
there was some potential for tacit cooperation with China on 
preventing Japan from becoming a truly great power. After all, 
the original Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950 had been built on an 
anti-Japanese and anti-American basis. 
However, the rise of Japan, its trade friction with the 
United States, its search for new markets in Europe, and its 
greater investment elsewhere in East Asia, all suggested that 
the implications of a more independent Japan had to be 
reassessed. The Soviet Union had to determine whether it could 
contribute to Japanese independence, without recreating the 
military threats of the 1930s; whether Japan could be enticed 
into greater cooperation with the Soviet Union as part of this 
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independence; and, considering Japan's lax approach to selling 
high technology, whether the Soviet Union could obtain more 
from the Japanese than it had from the West Europeans. 
4. The U.S. Pacific Perspective 
Although the Russians reached the Pacific before the 
Americans and have a longer Pacific coastline that is closer to 
the key Pacific states of East Asia, the Americans were the first 
to recognize the economic benefits that could be gained from 
investments in East Asia. Even in the nineteenth century, 
Americans spoke of the coming Pacific Century, while the 
Soviet Union spoke of Asian security. As a Eurasian power, the 
Soviet Union will always be more likely to think in continental 
rather than maritime terms. 
By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union began to reassess why 
the United States had been concentrating on the Pacific 
dimension. Hence Gorbachev's call for a Helsinki-like Asian-
Pacific security scheme and the new east-oriented policy 
marked by the 1986 Vladivostok initiative. The Soviet Union 
also recognized that while most of the Pacific was an "American 
lake", U.S. power in the Pacific was essentially on the decline. 
Problems within the Australia-New Zealand-United States 
alliance (ANZUS) and between the United States and some of 
the Pacific islands, the instability of the Philippines, and unrest 
in South Korea, all suggested that there were limits to U.S. 
power. Growing trade friction with Japan and the NICs, 
coupled with a general U.S. retreat from continental Asia, 
suggested the Americans were vulnerable and there were new 
opportunities in this shifting balance of power. 
5. The End of the Third World 
By the late 1980s it had become easy to reject the notion of a 
North-South divide in the world. The North was divided into 
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an eastern and western component, and the South itself was 
deeply divided. The shock of oil price increases affected many 
developing states more than developed states. The ensuing debt 
crisis damaged the reputation and economic prospects of many 
Latin American developing states and left a small, but 
increasingly distinct, group of NICs. Most of the successful 
NICs were in East Asia, and all were U.S. allies of some kind. 
The NICs, most of which thrived with a defined command 
economy and some variant of Confucian meri tocrat ic 
government, had long been dismissed by the Soviet Union as 
aberrations and mere outposts of U.S. capitalism. But as China 
learned from and traded with the NICs, and the contrast to the 
basket cases of the neighboring socialist states became more 
apparent, Moscow reassessed the NICs 7 . With growing trade 
problems between the NICs and the United States, the growth 
of Japan as an alternative economic pole of power, and the 
Soviet Union's own less rigid ideological disposition, the 
Soviets began to think about potential new relationships in the 
Pacific. 
6. Comrade Basket Case 
The number of Communist states in the Pacific nearly 
doubled in 1975, and by 1979, the three new additions were 
Soviet allies. Then, more than at any other time since 1949, 
revolution and socialism could be seen as triumphant. The idea 
of a socialist bloc in the Pacific, as in Europe, made more sense. 
But two main problems existed—first, while China was 
socialist, it was an enemy. The detente of the early 1980s began 
to resolve this problem. 
Second all other Communist states in the Pacific were 
experiencing economic difficulties and were falling behind their 
non-Communist neighbors. The Soviet Union's resource 
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constraints and commitments to reform meant that new 
economic rigor would inevitably be applied to its Pacific 
comrades. Closer Sino-Soviet relations made the risk of 
pressuring recalcitrant Communists low. The allies would have 
no other country to turn to. 
B. PRIORITIES 
Thus the Pacific has been a region in great flux. Diversity, 
success, and flexibility have been key trends. When the Soviet 
Union decided to reassess its role in the region, it had few 
obvious choices, despite a recognition that the need for change 
was urgent. The following sections describe the priorities that 
have emerged for Moscow and the role the Soviet Union is 
likely to assume in the remaining 11 years until the Pacific 
Century. 
1. Minimizing the United States 
The Soviet Union professes to appreciate the U.S. role as a 
Pacific power as much as the U.S. role in European security 
plans. In contrast to Europe, where the Soviet Union has a 
stronger claim for the natural exclusion of the United States, 
the new recognition of the United States as a vital actor in 
Pacific security reflects the Soviet trend toward pragmatism. 
Yet in the Pacific, as in Europe, the Soviet Union would like to 
minimize American influence without allowing chaotic 
conditions to ensue. The Soviet Union is also in part, a status 
quo power and the diminished importance of the superpower 
balance is likely to mean a reduction in Soviet influence too. 
To an important extent, the Soviet Union sees its 
relationship with the United States in the Pacific as an 
extension of the global superpower balance. The Soviets tend to 
stress the Pacific's East Asian element because, apart from the 
islands and Australia and New Zealand, any other aspect of the 
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Pacific only incorporates the American role. Although "thinking 
Pacific", does have drawbacks in terms of legitimizing the U.S. 
role, the Soviets show they are not merely trying to score global 
points by diminishing the United States. By accepting the U.S. 
presence, Moscow recognizes that many East Asians feel more 
secure with at least a tacit American security guarantee. These 
states, especially many in ASEAN, and even Japan and South 
Korea, will feel comfortable dealing with the Soviet Union only 
if they know they can rely on countervailing American power. 
Chinese detente with the Soviet Union also depends to some 
extent on the presence of American power 8 . 
In economic terms, no Pacific observer would ignore the 
American presence. If the Soviet Union is serious about 
attracting foreign investment and taking part in the Pacific 
economic boom, it must recognize the success of American 
economic hegemony. Yet such recognition is not equivalent to 
accepting continued hegemony; at a minimum, this hegemony 
could be diluted through numerous deals with Moscow. The 
rise of Japan and the NICs, not to mention China, suggests that 
American hegemony is, in any event, fading and the 
restructuring of the international order may provide the Soviet 
Union with an opportunity to break this U.S. hegemony. The 
Soviet Union must accept U.S. accomplishments but hope that 
the Soviet Union can offer new opportunities of greater 
independence for the Pacific states if U.S. power declines. 
The possibility of direct U.S.-Soviet agreements in the 
Pacific does not seem to be a likely priority. Despite some 
innovative ideas, and previous joint struggles against 
European colonialism in the Pac i f ic 9 , the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship remains more global and European-oriented. 
Soviet and American scientists met at Khabarovsk in August 
1987 to discuss cooperation between enterprises on the U.S. and 
Soviet Pacific coasts, and foreign ministry officials have met to 
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discuss Pacific issues. Joint expeditions to the Bering Sea and-
central Pacific took place in 1988 as good will efforts to officially 
investigate pollution control 1 0 . In spite of these meetings, the 
Soviet decision to explore and exploit its maritime mineral zone 
in the Pacific must be worrying to the United States. The area, 
east of Hawaii towards Mexico, is in the heart of an important 
American naval security zone. Not since the early nineteenth 
century has Russian power extended so close to Pacific North 
America and presented such a potential challenge to the 
"American lake" 1 1 . 
The United States may not be the only or even the most 
serious threat to Soviet security in the Pacific, but determining 
what proportion of the global confrontation with the United 
States takes place in the Pacific is important. The Soviet Union 
has traditionally felt threatened in the Pacific, if only because it 
has been forced to concentrate on the primary threat in Europe. 
When the threat in the Pacific was defined as emanating mainly 
from the United States and Japan in the 1950s, the Soviet Union 
had the benefit of China as an ally. But the Sino-Soviet split 
soon redefined Soviet priorities, and the Chinese were 
perceived as the main challenge. Until the late 1970s, China was 
the primary focus of the Soviet military buildup. With Sino-
Soviet detente came the first reductions in Soviet forces 
arrayed against China 1 2 . 
The simplistic phrase, the Soviet Far East military buildup, 
obscures a number of changes that have occurred over the 
years. While most of the buildup was directed against China 
until the late 1970s, during the past decade, efforts have focused 
on the United States and Japan. One of the essential features of 
the new international politics in the Asian-Pacific region is the 
military retreat of both superpowers. For the Soviet Union, the 
retreat has been more recent. The quagmire of Afghanistan and 
the sink-hole of Vietnam have encouraged the new Soviet 
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leadership to reassess its global commitments. After the 
departure of Admiral Gorshkov and Marshal Grechko, the 
chief military advocates of flagwaving and long-range power 
projection, the Soviet armed forces have been pulled back 
somewhat from their forward positions. Even the Soviet Pacific 
fleet is spending 25 percent fewer days at sea and the old cry of 
the expanding Soviet military presence in the Pacific is no 
longer accura te 1 3 . By 1988 the number of Soviet strategic 
submarines in the Pacific were 75 percent of their 1986 peak, the 
number of non-strategic submarines were 80 percent of their 
1984 peak, the number of primary ships were 82 percent of their 
1983 peak, and naval combat aircraft were 87 percent of their 
1986 peak. 
The Soviet armed forces began reexamining their naval 
strategy, emphasis on protected sea-bastions and long-range 
naval power even before Gorbachev. Indeed, the emergence of 
a group of new military leaders with extensive experience in 
the Far Eastern establishment has apparently brought a new 
pragmatism into the highest military offices about the use of 
force in the region 1 4. 
Contrary to many predictions of an uncontrolled Soviet 
military buildup, it is now clear that the Soviet Union is as 
interested in arms control in the Pacific as it is in Europe. The 
elimination of weapons in the Soviet Far East as part of the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement is a case in point, 
as is the announcement in December 1988 that 260,000 troops 
would be cut from Soviet forces in Asia, including 200,000 in the 
Far Eastern Theater, by the end of 1990. Gorbachev's policy in 
the Pacific has given arms control a higher priority 1 5. Following 
the INF accord and the far-reaching provisions for verification, 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed confidence-building 
measures in the Pacific following the European model that 
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could include inspection of military bases, perhaps even leading 
to the mutual stand-down of forces 1 6 . 
The swift American dismissal of the Soviet Pacific proposals 
is not surprising. The United States has a superior military 
position in the Pacific, then the United States will have to 
relinquish more than the Soviet Union. The Soviets could use 
such asymmetries as a propaganda tool with which to 
embarrass the United States. For example, the United States 
has complained about the threat posed by the Soviet military 
presence at Cam Ranh Bay, but would not agree to relinquish 
U.S. bases in the Philippines if the Soviets gave up Cam Ranh 
Bay, as proposed by Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk in September 
1988. 
A wide range of differences between European and Pacific 
security do exist, but because the USSR's diplomatic position 
appears easier to defend on military issues in the Pacific, the 
Soviet leadership is likely to pursue its rather ludicrous schemes 
such as a Pacific Helsinki or the application measures similar to 
those at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). The grandiose thoughts behind such confidence-
building measures are now a familiar part of the Gorbachev 
style. Like proposals for Mediterranean security, the ideas are 
not serious and are reminiscent of the 1950s style of Soviet 
propaganda gestures, but the Soviet Union is serious in its 
recognition of the connection between European and Pacific 
security. Hence the agreement on a global zero in the 1987 INF 
accord, the decision to sign the Raratonga pact as a means of 
increasing anti-nuclear pressure within America's alliances, or 
the December 1988 simultaneous troop cuts in Asia and Europe. 
Such global security concepts should be well understood in 
the West. The notion of trilateralism and increasing European 
recognition of the importance of the Pacific mean that 
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Gorbachev's calls for global security will not be completely alien 
to Western ears. But if the Soviet Union seriously believes that 
it can only enhance its Pacific role through Helsinki-like security 
schemes, then it will forever remain on the sidelines. Just as 
Helsinki followed a de facto stabilization of the balance of 
power in Europe, so the absence of any such stabilization in the 
Pacific rules out a formal accord. The more complex balance of 
power in the Pacific makes multilateral confidence-building 
measures, such as the observation of troop maneuvers, mind-
boggling; there would have to be nearly as many observers as 
troops being observed. 
In the final analysis, the Soviet Union recognizes that the 
superpower balance is far less relevant in the Pacific than in 
Europe. Nor is it necessary to negotiate through Washington to 
reach local states in the Pacific. The United States is useful as 
merely a mirror for Soviet power—the United States can 
indicate that the Soviet Union is an acceptable and positive 
force in the region through summits with the Soviet Union and 
by allowing the Soviet Union into such multilateral Pacific 
organizations as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference 
(PECC). As in the European experience, the Soviets are not 
seeking out the United States as a trading partner or a political 
ally; the Soviets are awaiting a decline of U.S. influence, as 
Washington fails to resolve trade and defense disputes with its 
capitalist allies. Under such conditions, the Soviet Union will 
launch its main effort; building bridges to the states on the 
Pacific west rim. After all, the Soviet Union is their immediate 
neighbor; the United States is not. 
2. Co-opting China 
The tortuous path from war in 1969 to normalized Sino-
Soviet relations in 1989 has already been well documented 1 7 . 
The international balance of power has seen no such major 
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change since the original Sino-Soviet split or the normalization 
of Sino-American relations in the 1970s. In the Sino-Soviet 
case, healing has occurred in every major dimension of the 
original split. 
In ideological terms, China and the Soviet Union have 
abandoned name-calling and disparaging remarks about each 
other's versions of socialism. They now praise each other's bold 
experiments in reform Communism and exchange advice on 
how best to modernize an ideology that seems to have 
exhausted its ideas. Since both countries are still ruled by 
Communist Parties firmly committed to the Party's leading role, 
such ideological detente is crucial. Party-to-Party ties will be 
restored at the May 1989 summit, and Moscow allowed its East 
European allies to reinstitute such bonds with China several 
years earlier 1 8 . 
In military terms, both sides have stopped killing each 
other's troops along the border and local officials regularly 
meet to resolve disputes. Both sides have withdrawn 
approximately 80,000 troops in what can be considered far-
reaching arms control, although no formal agreement has been 
signed. Tacit confidence-building measures are in operation as 
Soviet maneuvers are restrained in size and sca l e 1 9 . At 
Vladivostok, Gorbachev made major concessions to China over 
their disputed river border, and the ensuing frontier 
demarcation talks have made rapid progress. In December 
1988, Gorbachev announced that 200,000 troops would be 
removed from the Far Easter Theater-some 40 percent of the 
total proposed cuts—although only 25 percent of Soviet forces 
are deployed in this area. China was apparently planning to cut 
an additional 500,000 from its armed forces as a result. 
In economic terms, trade was booming despite a downturn 
in 1987. China had become the Soviet Union's second largest 
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trading partner in the Pacific (after Japan) and the Soviet Union 
had moved up to fifth place among traders with China 2 0 . China 
has even opened a distinctive northern door to trade and cross-
border relations in the northeast 2 1 . This barter commerce is 
always in balance and therefore involves little hard currency 
and no crippling debts. Soviet technicians have returned to 
China to help refurbish old plants and build new ones. During 
1988 agreements between the two nations covered 30 
enterprises 2 2. Delegations shuttling across the border to discuss 
future cooperation are now too numerous to be of special note. 
In terms of the attitude towards the United States, both the 
Soviet Union and China now agree on the need for detente 
with Washington. Both countries have lost some of their 
paranoia about the prospects of being out-maneuvered in the 
great power triangle. Both Moscow and Beijing now exchange 
reports on their respective relations with the United States, and 
the Soviet Union took pleasure in December 1987 in giving 
China a higher level briefing on the Washington summit than 
China received from the United States 2 3 . 
In terms of conflict in the developing world, both sides 
regard the United States as the major great power culprit in 
most conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America and 
there has been a clear convergence in policies. Of the two major 
obstacles in Asia-Afghanistan and Kampuchea-progress has 
been made on both. China has been impressed by the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Soviet support 
for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea had been the last 
major outstanding issue, but by 1988, and especially Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Beijing, China accepted that 
Moscow had done enough in pressing the Vietnamese to leave 
Kampuchea. While the Soviet Union and China are unable to 
enforce a settlement in Indochina, they certainly have gone a 
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long way to removing the issue from the Moscow-Beijing 
agenda 2 4 . 
While some observers still dismiss such far-reaching detente 
as "change on the margins", this skepticism is becoming 
increasingly difficult to sustain. Nearly all change in 
international relations is on the margins (witness the 3 percent 
cuts in nuclear arsenals in the much-heralded INF agreement). 
Sino-Soviet relations will be formally normalized by the Deng-
Gorbachev summit in mid-May 1989 2 5 . Thus it is necessary to 
assess the main features of the new Sino-Soviet detente and its 
effect on the outside world. 
I o The Importance of Reform Communism 
The ideology that governs the Soviet Union, China, and 13 
other Communist states, is undergoing its most extensive 
reexamination since the Chinese revolution in 1949. Not since 
the founding of the regimes have such fundamental questions 
been asked about how to adapt Communist systems to the 
modern world—and it is more than coincidence that both 
Communist superpowers are undertaking such a revision at the 
same time. 
Important differences do exist between Chinese and Soviet 
Communism, but the two ideologies are now facing more 
similar challenges and adopting more similar solutions than at 
any time since the "honeymoon" in Sino-Soviet relations during 
the late 1950s. In fact, it is impossible to offer an adequate 
explanation for the cause and course of current Sino-Soviet 
detente without understanding the extent to which both China 
and the Soviet Union have served as "mirrors of socialism" for 
each other 2 6 . China and the Soviet Union have much to learn 
from each other, if only because essential features of their 
political systems remain s imi l a r 2 7 . Both are command 
economies ruled by a Communist Party. Both are large, 
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continental, Communist states and therefore face different 
problems and opportunities than some European states. As long 
as reformers remain in power in both the Soviet Union and 
China, the similarities in their reform experiences will help 
ensure that both states continue to pay close attention to each 
other's domestic ideology. As China focuses on the initial stage 
of socialism and the Soviet Union elaborates its ideas of 
developing socialism, clearly much parallel, if not similar, 
ideological rethinking is taking p lace 2 8 . The restoration of 
formal ties among the media, publishers, youth leagues, and 
other social organizations have far-reaching implications for 
these one-Party states. Despite Chinese denials to Westerners 
that these contacts are anything but routine, there is a level of 
official connection peculiar to states ruled by Communist 
Parties. Official Chinese visitors to Moscow for the 70th 
anniversary of the Russian Revolution agreed with their hosts 
that this was "your [China's] festival too" 2 9 . 
However, both the Chinese and the Soviets emphasize that 
the future will not include a return to the close alliance of the 
1950s. Just as superpower detente in the 1980s is different from 
the spirit of Camp David in the late 1950s, so too does the 
modern Sino-Soviet friendship differ. The restoration of Party-
to-Party ties signifies fully normalized relations, for between 
Communist states, relations at the Party level are more 
important than State-to-State contacts. During wars between 
C o m m u n i s t count r ies ( C h i n a - U S S R , Ch ina -Vie tnam, 
Kampuchea-Vietnam), State ties were maintained, but Party 
ties were not. 
The implications of the impending restoration of inter-Party 
ties will not be obvious to the layperson. Unlike economic 
agreements or even tacit arms control, it is difficult to see 
tangible results. But greater consultation between Party 
officials will help create the bonds that come from similar 
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experiences in reforming Communism. Gorbachev has already 
learned lessons (joint ventures, special economic zones, even 
agricultural reform) from China and such exchanges of 
exper ience are l ikely to c o n t i n u e 3 0 . Gorbachev has 
demonstrated a remarkable absence of hubris in discussing 
reform with China, so much so that China has now accepted 
that Gorbachev does not seek to impose a common law on all 
Communis t s . For example , China was impressed by 
Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988 and the 
apparent ly moderated line about the independence of 
Communist movements 3 1 . 
The Soviet Union has openly admitted that its faulty 
leadership under Stalin, Brezhnev, and Khrushchev was 
responsible for serious errors in foreign policy that led to the 
split with China and border clashes 3 2 . If Chinese resentment at 
playing "younger brother" was at the heart of the original split, 
Moscow's new realism seems to have greatly impressed the 
Chinese. As both Parties appreciate the problems of learning 
from the West while avoiding the noxious influences of 
bourgeois liberalism, they may even begin to appreciate the 
greater need to distance socialist states somewhat from the 
market-capitalism that lies at the heart of the Pacific Century. 
Certainly the distinctive pattern of trade that has developed 
between the Soviet Union and China owes a great deal to 
ideology mixed with reform. Close cooperation between 
planning authorities in trade arrangements suits the essentially 
centrally planned structure of both economies. While 
liberalization and decentralization are taking place in both 
states, the leading role of the Party and its planning authorities 
have not disappeared. While there are sound economic reasons 
for bilateral trade, the advantages that derive from trading 
with another centrally planned economy equally concerned 
about undue dependence on the capitalist system cannot be 
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ignored. Both China and the Soviet Union increasingly oppose 
Cocom regulations especially as they hinder Japan and other 
developed Pacific economies from trading freely with either 
Communist power 3 3 . 
Sino-Soviet trade and joint ventures will undoubtedly 
expand eventually. The trade problems experienced in 1987 
have been resolved; nevertheless, as long as the reform process 
in both countries continues to change, the pattern of trade will 
remain uncertain. Chinese investment in a project in 
Uzbekistan, joint development of river power-generating 
resources, and Soviet aid to Chinese light and heavy industry 
are all deals that are likely to flourish. The two sides are even 
cooperating in the exploration of Antarctica. Decentralization 
in both the Soviet Union and China will aid Sino-Soviet trade 
as much as Western trade with China. The Soviet Union even 
plans to allow its regional enterprises to establish direct links 
with Chinese firms and department stores 3 4 . The Soviet Union 
and China will increase their involvement in the international 
socialist economy as well as in the international capitalist 
economy. But Sino-Soviet detente need not come at the expense 
of the two countries relations, with the capitalist world. 
2° Demilitarization and Arms Control 
Sino-Soviet detente depends to an important extent on 
China's perception that the Soviet Union is no longer an 
imminent threat and on the USSR's perception that China is 
unlikely to join forces with the United States and Japan in an 
anti-Soviet coalition. Trends in the Asian-Pacific region appear 
to support these premises for the foreseeable future. Japanese-
American and Sino-American disputes have grown in the past 
five years, albeit for very different reasons. Sino-American 
disputes over spies, technology transfer, and the description by 
some U.S. officials of China as a threat, indicate the obvious 
limits to Sino-American detente 3 5. 
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For these reasons, the bilateral detente along the Sino-
Soviet frontier is likely to continue. Border demarcation talks 
will be successful and, although some tensions will remain, both 
sides will have established sufficient structures for confidence-
building that future disputes will be unlikely to become unruly. 
The fact that the Soviet Union is helping to fund a second 
Chinese rail line that will bypass the Trans-Siberian system 
(and surpass it in trade volume) and will provide an alternative 
link for European-Pacific trade, is an example of likely future 
cooperation 3 6 . The more such trade links criss-cross the region, 
the less incentive there will be for war. 
Given the geography and demography of the border 
regions, some instability is inevitable. If the central European 
frontier tells us anything, detente can incorporate both 
continuing military tension and basic confidence-building 
measures simultaneously. China and the Soviet Union are 
never likely to completely lower their armed guard, but detente 
can limit military paranoia and therefore eventually limit 
defense spending. Such an improved military environment 
leads to more cross-border contacts and greater economic 
integration between the two frontier regions, which in turn 
diminishes the likelihood of conflict. 
Clearly, the Sino-Soviet military relationship is not strictly 
bilateral. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan derailed an earlier 
attempt at Sino-Soviet detente. China has been impressed by 
the triumph of a small neighbor's nationalism over the might of 
the Soviet Red Army. But it is also concerned that the power of 
such nationalism, when coupled with a potent religion, can 
defeat the appeal of modernizing Communism. The 
implications for the USSR's own nationality problems are not 
too different from the potentially destabilizing effect on China's 
own fringes. China's Tibet problem is a case in point. As both 
Communist powers are the only two old empires still in control 
63 
of their vassals, they tread carefully when confronting the 
power of nationalism. 
Nationalism is also at the root of the Vietnam-Kampuchea 
problem. Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea is related to 
ancient Vietnamese claims of influence throughout Indochina. 
Hence China's desire to control Vietnam also has deep 
historical, nationalist roots. The Soviet Union has encountered 
this nationalism when trying to encourage Vietnam to leave 
Kampuchea, and Moscow has found it difficult to build bridges 
to the Communist governments of Laos and Kampuchea 
without antagonizing its Vietnamese ally. Until recently, 
China's own nationalism prevented it from lifting some of its 
pressure on Vietnam. If Beijing were to limit its pressure on 
Vietnam, it is likely that natural Kampuchean nationalism, plus 
the Soviet desire to move independently of Vietnam, could 
result in a less powerful Vietnamese role in the region. 
But even if the Chinese strategy of getting at Vietnam 
through the Soviet Union has delayed a settlement, most signs 
now indicate that a deal is in sight. China's decision to allow 
Prince Sihanouk some manoeuvering space suggests it might 
now be willing to give Kampuchean nationalism a chance. 
Under Soviet pressure, Vietnam has certainly eased its hard 
line, and now has the positive example of the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. In May 1988, Vietnam 
announced that half its remaining troops in Kampuchea would 
be withdrawn, beginning in June, while the last contingents 
would be placed under Kampuchean control. The complete 
withdrawal was promised by 1990 3 7 . It is still too early to tell 
what the future of Kampuchea will be, but it is already clear 
that China and the Soviet Union have moderated their own 
positions sufficiently to allow a Sino-Soviet summit. China still 
notes the issues are not fully resolved, but at least it is now 
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more willing to tolerate some unpleasant aspects of Soviet 
policy 3 8. 
China's growing naval presence in the disputed Spratly 
islands off Vietnam in March 1988 put the new Soviet thinking 
to the test. Moscow's lukewarm support for Vietnam's position 
suggested that China might well be able to take advantage of 
the Soviet desire to protect Sino-Soviet detente to satisfy 
China's nationalist claims. At a time of Chinese sensitivity 
because of unrest in Tibet, unresolved nationalism remains a 
potent problem. 
Thus the new agenda for Sino-Soviet relations in Indochina 
will focus more on competititon for influence among national 
Communisms than mirror the outright hostility of the 1970's. 
Assuming that Vietnam does withdraw from Kampuchea by 
1990, the day is not far off when the Communist states of the 
Pacific can begin to cooperate in peace. The possibilities for a 
Sino-Vietnamese detente eventually developing in ways similar 
to Sino-Soviet detente must be taken seriously. The possibilities 
of greater cooperation among all the Communist states of the 
Pacific might offer an alternative to closer integration with the 
capitalist world. Certainly, control over the last remaining hot 
wars in the Pacific will mean that the military dimension of 
Sino-Soviet relations will be less important than at any time 
since the 1950s. 
3° The Great Power Triangle 
The great power triangle has been a feature of Sino-Soviet 
relations from the time the People's Republic of China was 
created in 1949. Only in the late 1980s did both Communist 
powers learn that a degree of cooperation and conflict with the 
United States was normal for both states. To benefit most, all 
three states must have a least a modicum of detente with each 
other. In an era of detente, this competition in cooperation 
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encourages diplomatic shuttles between capitals as each 
country tries to ensure it is not missing out on subtle 
maneuvering. 
In an era of declining superpower influence and the rising 
power of Japan and China, such games are even more difficult. 
The historical pattern suggests that as long as no side suffers 
prolonged setbacks, all will tolerate the spiral of detente. Thus, 
a superpower arms control agreement no longer results in fall-
outs between China and the Soviet Union or China and the 
United States. Similarly, Sino-American relations do not 
collapse as Sino-Soviet detente develops, and Sino-Soviet 
detente does not fade when the United States sells arms to 
China. 
The great power relationship has become more stable, 
largely because China has matured. It was a potent mix of 
Chinese, and to some extent, Soviet paranoia that prohibited 
the great power triangle from adjusting itself at the margins 
without one party complaining loudly. The development of 
genuine independence in Chinese foreign policy has been 
appreaciated in both Moscow and Washington. Although the 
United States complains about China's "two Americas policy" 
(China's habit of taking American aid while denoucing some of 
its policies), the new triangle will make such policy dilemmas 
more natural and less destabilizing. 
Yet other sources of destabilization do exist. For example, 
there is the issue of Japanese rearmament-the problem of the 
Japanese economic superpower searching for a broader foreign 
policy role is one of the great imponderables of future Pacific 
international politics. The United States has urged Japan to 
spend more on defence, and Japan now has the largest defence 
budget after the superpowers. The purposes of this new power 
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deeply concern China, the Soviet Union and various other 
Pacific states 3 9 . 
The more China and the Soviet Union denounce Japanese 
rearmament, the less reason they will have to be in dispute. 
While the renewed Sino-Soviet detente does not signal a return 
to the 1950s balance of power, when the Sino-Soviet alliance 
was explicitly forged against Japan, it is instructive that Sino-
Soviet detente can still be enhanced by a growing sense of 
common threat. It is difficult to imagine anyway that the 
Japanse military buildup can occur without upsetting both 
China and the USSR. Simply put, the crucial North Pacific 
balance is necessarily a complex mix of two superpowers and 
two mismatched great powers, China and Japan. Concerns 
about Japan and the United States have been emphasized in 
Soviet Pacific naval strategy for five years, as has China's 
move to a blue-water navy and its diminishing concern about 
the threat from Soviet ground forces. This quadrilateral 
balance of power may well replace triangular thinking and 
offer further prospects for a less obsessive attitude between the 
Soviets and Chinese. 
4° New International Relations 
New trends in the broader international system are helping 
to reshape Sino-Soviet relations. One vital tendency is the 
reduction in military conflict in East Asia and a general retreat 
of the superpowers from foreign military engagements. A 
constant feature of Soviet superpower status was the belief 
that the country was better able to compete militarily than 
economica l ly 4 0 . This incomplete superpower derived much 
influence from its ability to intervene around the globe and 
support allies at war. China, by contrast, had no such reach and 
as in the Angolan civil war, had to retreat from confrontation. 
China's sense of inferiority vis-á-vis the Soviet Union had 
much to do with its inability to compete militarily. 
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With reduced opportunities for intervention, especially in 
East Asia, China felt more comfortable about detente with the 
USSR. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the United 
States were at least tacitly cooperating to keep the conflicts 
under control and avoid direct intervention, as seen most 
vividly in the Gulf war. For its part, China was testing a new, 
very different policy toward distant conflicts. Its massive 
provision of arms to both sides of the Iran-Iraq conflict showed 
that China could begin to compete on superpower terms; in 
fact,, Beijing perceived benefits (primarily economic) from 
conflict in the developing world. The gap between Chinese and 
Soviet power projection capability was being reduced, but at a 
time when the superpowers perceived a declining utility in such 
long-range power. 
When these trends are coupled with the new pragmatism in 
Chinese foreign policy, for example in dealing with South 
Korea, Israel and Saudi Arab ia 4 1 , it is clear that the Soviet 
Union and China have fewer disputes around the globe than at 
any time since the 1950s. If they continue to agree, in most cases, 
that the United States is the main problem in Third World 
conflict, then even a more assertive Chinese foreign policy will 
not upset Sino-Soviet relations. Allowing China to arm Iran 
enables the Soviet Union to profess good intentions in its 
dealings with the United States and foster superpower detente. 
The current situation is in marked contrast to the problems such 
entangling conflicts in the developing world caused for the last 
version of superpower detente in the 1970s. 
In general, the decline of direct intervention in conflicts in 
developing states is likely to mean less friction in Sino-Soviet 
relations. It is also likely to drive both Communist powers into a 
more economic-based foreign policy as both concentrate on 
their domestic modernization. Moreover, like other great 
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powers, China and the USSR have also come to accept that its 
is necessary to rethink old images of the Third World. 
This rethinking is based on the rise of the NICs, the majority 
in East As ia 4 2 . Their development suggests that the route to 
modernization is not through isolation from international 
capital, as Tanzania attempted. Rather the route to greater 
strength and independence is, paradoxically, through greater 
interdependence in the international market. Even continental 
Communist powers have come to recognize that they can 
benefit from the international capitalist economy without losing 
control of their destiny. 
Of course, the need to modernize the decrepit ecoomies of 
the leading Communist states had its own motivations deep 
within the centrally planned system. As the success of China has 
shown, reform that includes an opening up to the international 
economy can be highly successful. The Soviet Union has paid 
attention to these lessons. Thus Moscow and Beijing are 
cooperating in reform Communism, and they are exploring 
new contacts with a wide range of states in the developing 
world. The East Asian NICs are particularly attractive to both 
states and, given their location, the parallel advances from both 
Communist powers helps ensure stability in the region. 
The new Sino-Soviet detente has facilitated Chinese and 
Soviet trade with South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN and even 
Hong Kong 4 3 . Sino-Soviet detente appears to be leading to 
more varied patterns of international economic relations in the 
Pacific. Although the Soviet Union is aware that, to some 
extent, the two Communist powers are economic competitors, 
Moscow wants to use more commodity trade than China, 
which is more interested in industrial coproduction 4 4. 
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Once again, reform Communism, this time coupled with 
new trends in the international economy, is bringing Moscow 
and Beijing closer. They may draw closer still, since both appear 
to have deep reservations about unrestricted involvement in the 
international capitalist economy. A new challenge, if not a new 
option for the two countries, will be the creation of a more 
integrated and successful international socialist economy. With 
the new ideas of reform Communism, a looser and more 
efficient basis for cooperation might be found 4 5 . If the 
burgeoning Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian trade are proof, 
there is much room for improvement and some scope for an 
international socialist division of labor. 
5° The New Sino-Soviet Agenda 
The new Sino-Soviet detente is driven by the twin engines 
of the need for domestic reform and new trends in the 
international environment, yet the craft is still buffeted by 
unexpected winds. There will continue to be turbulent times in 
Sino-Soviet relations, but any mature detente between great 
powers will incorporate both competition and cooperation. 
Clearly, Sino-Soviet relations have changed dramatically 
from even a decade ago. Trends for the future suggest even 
greater cooperation to be derived from the parallel reform 
process, although profound doubts must remain about how 
successful the reforms will be in the long run. Economic 
cooperation is likely to expand, resulting in new and 
increasingly complex foreign trade ventures and accelerating 
the decentralization process in both countries. 
The confrontational military dimension of the relationship 
is clearly declining and it seems clear that there will be fewer 
disputed bilateral and multilateral military issues. The Soviet 
Union will remain the main potential threat to Chinese security, 
but this threat will be reduced, while other distracting threats 
70 
may emanate from Japan or Taiwan. Certainly, there will be 
less room for the United States to exploit either Soviet or 
Chinese fears within the great power triangle. The pattern of 
interdependence in Asia, the Pacific and the international 
balance of power is evident. 
The main states to gain from this detente, in addition to 
China and the USSR, will be most of their East Asian neighbors. 
Reduced tensions will please most states, although perhaps not 
initially the East Asian Communists, who will be pressured to 
reform. Other Asian states, such as India or Pakistan, might 
also suffer as their ability to play one Communist power 
against the other is reduced. 
Japan, the United States, and indeed the West Europeans 
have a more complex judgment to make. They will undoubtedly 
benefit from reduced tensions and the ability of East Asians to 
move toward economic prosperity relatively free of war scares. 
Sino-Soviet detente is in the interest of the major Western 
powers in the short-, and perhaps even midterm future, but this 
new age of Sino-Soviet detente may also pose greater 
challenges for the West. If reform Communism is successful and 
another viable option for development and modernization 
emerges, the pleasure that the West derives from comparing 
Communist basket cases to the East Asian NICs may then fade. 
More disturbing still, prolonged Communist detente might help 
shift the vital northeast Asian balance of power. Japan, 
increasingly dissatisfied with its Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD) economic relationship with the United States (the ability 
of both to do serious harm to the other's economy), might seek 
the greater independence that is likely to come from building 
bridges to a more amenable Communist world next door in 
Asia. Three-way trade relations might offer an interesting mix 
of markets and resources and help lessen dependence on the 
United States. Certainly a China and a Soviet Union more 
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committed to international economic relations might seem less 
fearful to Japan. 
3. The Potential of Japan 
The Soviet Union first consolidated its detente with China, 
and Japan appears to be next on the Soviet agenda in the 
Pacific. However, the Soviet Union knows that it probably 
cannot easily achieve the same kind of rapid results with Japan 
as it has with China. Traditionally, Russia has always had 
problems in simultaneously improving relations with both 
China and Japan and since 1945, the task has become even more 
difficult. But now that Sino-Soviet relations are normalized, 
detente with Japan cannot be far behind. 
The Soviet need to choose between the two great East Asian 
powers was based on a number of factors, including ideology 
and suspicion of a quadrilateral balance of power in northeast 
Asia. If only because of its vast border with China, Sino-Soviet 
relations were always likely to be more important for the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, a positive response to Soviet overtures 
seemed more probable from China than from Japan. Thus, 
when Mikhail Gorbachev decided to remake Soviet policy in the 
Pacific, it was only natural that China would be the first target. 
It was equally natural that Japan would be piqued. 
1°Japanese Independence 
Japan, like Britain, is notable for its close relations with the 
United States, and its ability to distance itself from continental 
security concerns if it so desires. In the case of Great Britain, 
Mrs. Thatcher's closeness to the United States makes Britain an 
attractive partner for the Soviet Union to use in making 
overtures to Washington. But so far, Japan has not benefited 
from a similar Soviet initiative. The reasons are related to the 
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Soviet Union's China initiative and to Japanese coolness to 
Soviet overtures. 
Unlike West European countries, Japan has few local allies 
to give breadth to its foreign policy. In an era of growing trade 
friction with the United States and the hollowing out of sectors 
of the Japanese economy, Tokyo has barely moved past the 
slogans of internationalism in search of a more genuinely 
independent foreign policy. As an economic superpower and a 
international political dwarf, Japan poses awkward problems 
for the Soviet Union. 
If the Soviet Union is content to leave Japan as a U.S. ally 
and simply concentrate on developing the great power triangle 
in the Pacific, then Soviet-Japanese relations will stagnate. It 
would certainly be more challenging and perhaps more 
productive, for the Soviet Union to anticipate the possibility of 
encouraging Japan to adopt a more genuinely independent 
position. 
Based on history, the risks of a more independent Japan are 
evident throughout the Pacific. In the 1930s, however, China 
had no real power to stand up to Japan, and it was only the 
Manchurian campaign in 1945 that brought Soviet military 
power to the Pacific in strength. A more independent Japan in 
the twenty-first century would be far more constrained by the 
Communist powers. 
To a large extent, the Soviet Union can count on Japanese 
confidence and arrogance to encourage Tokyo to develop 
greater independence, but if the result is to be favorable to 
Soviet interests, the Soviet Union must also encourage the 
Japanese to include the Soviets in any new plans. While 
possible, this will require even more reform and initiative from 
Mikhail Gorbachev. 
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2° Territory and Security 
Japanese discussions about the return of the Northern 
Territories are not very different from pre-Helsinki West 
European demands for territorial adjustment. Few had any real 
expectation that territory would change hands, but the West 
Germans in particular had good domestic and alliance reasons 
for keeping up the revanchist line. Helsinki essentially ratified 
the broad principle hammered out in the series of treaties 
resulting from Brandt's Ostpolitik. Whether Japan is on the 
verge of emulating Brandt remains to be seen. 
The differences between European and Pacific security are 
obvious, as are the differences between Japan and Germany. 
For instance, Japan can develop relations with Communist 
China without going through Moscow and there are no ethnic-
Japanese "held hostage" by a state allied to the Soviet Union. 
But at least one essential commonality is important—Japan, like 
Germany, increasingly recognizes that genuine independence 
requires building bridges to Moscow. The dream of a strong 
Sino-Japanese relationship is now fading in Tokyo, especially 
as China begins to strike deals with the NICs and undercuts the 
terms of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. The more 
obvious Japanese-American difficulties also raise basic 
questions about Japan's role into the twenty-first century. 
Throughout the years, the territorial issue has become more 
of a political symbol; there is increasing evidence that a 
symbolic agreement on the northern territories will shift the 
domestic Japanese debate sufficiently to remove the territorial 
issue. Similarly, the question of principle rather than territory is 
also evident in Sino-Soviet detente as they resolve their border 
dispute. Little land, and certainly nothing of importance will 
change hands, but China is satisfied that the principle of a 
Soviet concession has been made. It is partly a matter of pride, 
but more likely a matter of being treated as an equal, that is so 
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important to weaker powers dealing with the Soviet 
superpower. 
If a symbolic arrangement can be made, resulting changes 
could include regular meetings of Soviet and Japanese leaders, 
official Japanese support for exploration of economic contacts, 
and admission of the Soviet Union as a PECC member and 
participant in Pacific-wide discussions. Such an arrangement 
will not eliminate the Soviet Union as Japan's major security 
concern, nor will it make the Japanese-American security 
framework obsolete. Japan, like China, can only deal with the 
Soviet Union from a "position of strength". But a more 
confident Japan, like France, may well slip out from under the 
U.S. security umbrella, content to know the Americans are 
never far away in case of crisis. 
3° Economic Potential 
Security concerns are usually placed first in discussions of 
Soviet-Japanese relations, but that should not disguise the fact 
that economic cooperation will cement any more positive future 
relationship. Among the factors that could contribute to 
improved bilateral relations are the complementary resources 
and level of economic development between the Soviet Far East 
and Japan; Soviet appreciation of Japanese economic success; 
Soviet desi re to demonstra te greater openness; the 
decentralization of the Soviet economy and priority being given 
to the Far East; and the advent of a new generation of more 
sophisticated Japanologists. 
In terms of joint ventures, the Soviet Union is evidently 
more interested in Japanese contributions of technology 
(especially electronics) than in investment. Soviet officials speak 
of the need for new forms of cooperation such as free-trade 
zones and coproduction agreements as part of the development 
plans through the year 2000. Moscow sees the Japanese being 
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squeezed between American protectionism and Chinese 
diversification. It expects Japan to diversify, moving more into 
Europe and East Asia and hopes for Japanese ventures in the 
Soviet Union. As the industrial spin-offs from the hollowing out 
of the Japanese economy emerge, the Soviet Union sees itself 
well placed to exploit some of the benefits 4 6. 
Soviet plans for special economic zones and joint ventures 
differ from the Chinese experience in that the Soviet Union will 
concentrate on raw material or processed raw material 
exports. By emphasizing at least basic processing of these 
resources, the Soviet Union hopes to be the provider of basic 
building blocks of economic success to a booming economic 
r e g i o n . Such a trade strategy depends not only on the success 
of Soviet reforms at home but also on the continuing need for 
Soviet raw materials. The lessons of the Gulf war, possible 
dangers in the South China Sea, and American unwillingness to 
sell Alaskan oil to Japan, should provide enough evidence to 
Japanese planners that diversification of raw materials must 
sensibly include purchases from the Soviet Union. 
Perhaps one of the best ways to tie the Soviet Union into the 
international economic culture of stability in the Pacific will be 
through multilateral economic deals. When Japanese firms 
arrange for Chinese shipyards to repair Soviet ships, whose 
catch is then marketed by japan, it is clear that interesting deals 
are possible. As the decentralization of the Soviet economy 
takes shape, the possibilities for complex multilateral joint 
ventures multiply. In addition, as the Soviet Union encourages 
Vietnam and North Korea to open up to Japanese investment, 
Tokyo will know that stable relations with the Soviet Union are 
essential to gaining access to all markets in the Pacific. 
In return, the Soviet Union will expect Japanese investment 
in specific projects and special economic zones and it will also 
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expect Japan to continue to be willing to sell sensitive high 
technology. The globalization of technology trade will help 
ensure that the Soviet Union has access to the most up-to-date 
Western technology and a vital card to play when negotiating 
with other Western companies. 
Participation in PECC and a more general normalization of 
the Soviet role in the Pacific is also likely to follow as part of 
Soviet-Japanese detente. The Soviet Union has created a 
national committee to work for membership in the PECC 
process and Japan seems to be softening its line against Soviet 
participation 4 8 . Soviet representatives attended the May 1988 
meeting in Osaka, largely because of the change in the Japanese 
line. Japanese approval is perhaps worth more than approval 
from the United States, at least in the Pacific. 
Soviet officials now admit the errors of previous policies on 
Pacific cooperation and have begun to contemplate several new 
ideas for attracting foreign investment. How much autonomy 
will be granted to the Soviet Far East remains the basic Soviet 
dilemma 4 9. 
4. Towards a Pacific Socialist Community 
Since the triumph of Communism in China in 1949, there 
have been few real gains for socialism. Considering the scale of 
the virtually uncontrolled process of decolonization, it is 
remarkable how few states adopted the state socialism of a 
one-Marxist-party state. Four of the nine new Communist 
regimes are in Asia and three of these four are in East Asia-
Pacific. By the late 1970s, there were nearly as many 
Communist regimes in Asia as in Europe 5 0 . 
The triumph of Communism in Vietnam, Laos and 
Kampuchea proved to be a mixed blessing for the Soviet Union. 
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The regimes in Laos and Kampuchea were among the poorest 
in the world and like most allied developing states, have been a 
burden on the Soviet Union. Kampuchea was to prove even 
more difficult, for under the Pol Pot regime, it waged war on 
Vietnam, drew Soviet support for Hanoi's imposition of a 
puppet regime and created a major obstacle to improved Soviet 
relations with China and ASEAN. 
The spread of Communism was hardly an advertisement 
for the benefits of alliance with the Soviet Union and a Soviet 
leadership that was relatively uninterested in the Pacific was 
unlikely to offer new thoughts on relations with its Pacific 
socialist community. New thoughts were also unlikely because 
of the vast differences and distances between the Pacific 
Communist states. Mongolia, the oldest ally, was almost 
totally dependent on the Soviet Union and deeply suspicious of 
any Sino-Soviet detente 5 1 . North Korea had long ago learned 
how to exploit Sino-Soviet rivalry and it grew concerned as 
detente allowed less room for maneuver. Vietnam had also 
played off the two Communist powers, but since the late 1970s 
had become heavily reliant on Soviet aid. Hanoi's fear of a 
Soviet sell out to ease Sino-Soviet detente have proved correct. 
Laos and Kampuchea were clearly within the Vietnamese orbit 
and offered little advantage and a great deal of headache to a 
reform-minded Soviet leadership. 
I o Domestic Reform 
The Soviet calculation of costs and benefits for the Pacific 
Communist regimes is less favorable than for the European 
regimes. The Pacific states are clearly more of an economic 
burden and will probably remain a frustration for the 
foreseeable future. The benefits are found in the more 
intangible dimension of military strategy and ideological 
rivalry. The obvious conclusion, finally acted on by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, was to risk some of the intangibles to reduce 
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economic costs. The method, as applied domestically in the 
Soviet Union, was reform. 
Vietnam by far the largest of the burdens, was first to feel 
the brisk winds of restructuring. With estimates of up to $5 
million per day being sunk into Vietnam, Gorbachev decided to 
obtain more reform for his rubles. In late 1986, the Vietnamese 
were pressured into changing their leadership and 
experimenting with economic and political reforms. The 
process obviously lags behind that of China and the Soviet 
Union, but it is more advanced than anywhere else in 
Communist As ia 5 2 . The Soviet Central Committee has held 
several extraordinary meetings to develop new aid packages to 
Vietnam that were tied to reforms and promises from Hanoi 
not to waste aid as they had in the past 5 3 . At its most basic level, 
this carrot and stick strategy is intended to reduce the 
Vietnamese burden on the USSR. 
More positively, the strategy is intended to transform 
Vietnam from a liability to a living example of the benefits of 
socialism. The scope for Soviet-Vietnamese economic 
cooperation is only now being properly explored. Soviet 
commentaries speak of the need to break out of old molds of 
thinking. The use of Vietnamese contract labor in the Soviet Far 
East (and in the German Democratic Republic) is a case in point 
and is intended to help solve severe Soviet labor shortages in its 
Pacific region 5 4 . Other new ideas include Soviet aid for the 
Vietnamese fishing industry and joint ventures that will involve 
produce sales to third countries 5 5. 
Vietnam has not yet made the transition from a war 
economy to a peaceful experiment in peasant socialism. In 
theory, the potential for successful reform in Vietnam is greater 
than anywhere in the region. With the positive example of 
Chinese agricultural reforms, now approved by Soviet 
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commentaries, Vietnam could achieve the kind of rapid and 
easy growth that China demonstrated in the past decade. The 
easing of the burden would be appreciated in Moscow and 
elsewhere within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon) where the commitment to aid Vietnamese 
reconstruction has been resented. 
Vietnam can, in fact, detract from the Chinese reform, by 
showing that even a state closely allied to the Soviet Union can 
achieve the kind of success so far seen only in China. To the 
extent that the Soviet Union is still concerned about alternative 
models of socialism (although Gorbachev seems more tolerant 
of different roads), diluting the importance of Chinese success 
will still be necessary. 
The risks of Vietnamese success are, as in the case of China, 
that Vietnam will build bridges elsewhere in the Pacific and 
therefore diminish Soviet influence. As the third most populous 
Communist state, Vietnam has the potential for a far more 
independent policy. Japan seems the most likely source of 
investment in Vietnam and some ASEAN states are also 
beginning to think of Vietnam as a partner. A confident Soviet 
Union will see in this diversification of Vietnamese policy the 
possibility of an enhanced Soviet relationship with Japan and 
ASEAN; however, an insecure Soviet Union will fear for its 
control and see another example of an ungrateful Communist 
ally (like China) slipping its moorings once the seas were 
calmed. 
The two other Indochinese Communist states, Laos and 
Kampuchea, are much smaller burdens and far less important 
to the USSR. So far, Vietnam has kept Moscow at arms length 
in these states for fear that the Soviet Union will develop its 
own channels to these gove rnmen t s 5 6 . Yet if Vietnam 
withdraws its direct control over Laos and Kampuchea after 
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1990, the scope for Soviet development of direct relations will 
increase. 
The main benefit for the Soviet Union will be to provide 
more checks and balances should Vietnam move to a more 
independent position. By capitalizing on local nationalism and 
offering to provide support, say to Kampuchea if Vietnam 
becomes difficults, the Soviet Union could help keep an uneasy 
band of allies together. But apart from the arcane game of 
Communist Party factional politics, it is difficult to see what 
major benefits the Soviet Union hopes to obtain from Laos and 
Kampuchea. 
Far more important to the Soviet Union are the northwest 
Pacific Communist states of Korea and Mongolia. Like the 
other allies in the region, these two provide different challenges 
and require the application of different Soviet policies. In terms 
of greater cooperation among socialist states in the Pacific, 
however, this very diversity can be advantageous for the 
Soviets. The North Korean economy, now at a virtual 
standstill, was once a model of Soviet-aided socialism in the 
developing world 5 7 . Certainly in comparison to South Korea, 
the model has lost its shine. The Soviets state clearly that North 
Korea, like Vietnam, has not made the most of Soviet assistance 
and that reform in the North Korean economy is long overdue 5 8 . 
As the most industrialized of the Pacific Communist states, 
North Korea could be turned into a more efficient producer of 
industrial goods in exchange for light industrial products and 
food from Indochina 5 9 . Such efforts, combined with Soviet raw 
materials and Chinese products, could produce a model of 
cooperation in the Pacific that is not based on market 
economies 6 0 . 
The requirements for such a socialist community depend 
heavily on the success of Soviet reform efforts, as well as 
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efforts by the Pacific Communist regimes. North Korea has 
been slow in moving toward reform, despite dual pressure from 
Moscow and Beijing. The anticipation of Kim II Sung's 
succession may account for part of this delay and it is likely that 
both the USSR and China are moving behind the scenes to 
ensure some reform once the succession takes place. Despite 
cautious skepticism by outside observers, recent successions in 
the other Pacific Communist states have shown that reform has 
followed a change of leadership. 
The Soviet Union has already managed to change the 
leadership and begin the process of reform in Mongolia. The 
Mongolian state will always remain artificial, sandwiched as it 
is between China and the Soviet Union. While Mongolian-
Chinese tension has lessened because of the Sino-Soviet 
detente, Mongolia's fear of China will mean its reliance on the 
Soviet Union and is unlikely to change. Mongolia will remain a 
conservative barometer of reform and cooperation in the 
Communist Pacific. Recent discussions of rail links, increased 
cross-border trade and multilateral cooperation with China, 
the Soviet Union and even North Korea, suggest that Mongolia 
is part of the new spirit of cooperation. Cooperation on rail 
links among the four northeast Asian Communist states is 
already well underway and there are indications that other 
multilateral arrangements are being explored 6 1 . If the positive 
mood prevails, then Mongolia's raw materials will travel to 
other parts of the Pacific aside from the Soviet Union. But 
unlike Vietnam, Mongolia has no real option of independence; 
therefore, the USSR is less concerned about pressuring the 
Mongolians. 
The USSR will tolerate a degree of diversity among the 
Pacific Communist states and if Eastern Europe is any model, 
that degree is increasing. An optimistic and ambitious Soviet 
leadership can use that diversity to shape a more efficient 
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socialist community in the Pacific. As with most other elements 
of change in the region, success depends on reforms at home 
and their successful transfer to the different conditions of other 
socialist states. 
As remote as the idea of closer cooperation may sound, it is 
not any more remote than the talk of economic cooperation 
among market economies of the Pacific. The Soviet Union 
remains ambiguous about whether it seriously wishes to 
develop the Communist Pacific community idea or whether it is 
just trying to strengthen its application for full membership in a 
broader Pacific-wide scheme. While the Soviet Union cannot 
ensure that its allies participate in a broader scheme, it can do 
more than any other state to ensure that Pacific cooperation 
proceeds in a peaceful atmosphere and with constructive 
contributions from its Communist members. For the time being, 
the Soviet Union appears to be keeping its options open. 
2° Reducing Military Tensions 
The two major areas of military tension in the Pacific 
involve Soviet allies. In Korea, the conflict has been under 
control for some time but could still erupt. In Indochina, tension 
is declining, but it continues to be a major obstacle to the vital 
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. In both cases, the 
Soviet Union has become a major supporter of detente. 
The Korean issue is perhaps the most illuminating example 
of the importance of Sino-Soviet detente and the way in which 
it affords the USSR possibilities in the Pacific. The Soviet Union 
has long supported detente on the Korean peninsula, but as 
long as China offered Pyongyang a radical alternative, there 
was little hope of stabilizing the conflict. China's shift in the 
1980s to pragmatic relations with South Korea enabled the 
Soviets to explore their own contacts with the South. China's 
trade with South Korea is worth up to ten times the Soviet 
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total, but the Soviet Union is perhaps moving faster in 
establishing formal ties. Certainly its East European allies are 
at an advanced stage of establishing official trade relations 6 2 . 
If the Soviet Union is successful, North Korean reaction to 
what it considers a sell out of its interests will be that 
Pyongyang will read the writing on the wall and improve its 
relations with South Korea. As the two Korean societies grow 
farther apart, a solution similar to Germany's becomes more 
likely. Mutual recognition, albeit possibly under the ruse of "one 
country, two systems", could allow the two Koreas to mature. 
Their neighbours might then move toward closer cooperation. 
Because the Cold War came to the Pacific later than to Europe, 
detente will also take longer to arrive. 
Another example of Sino-Soviet detente changing the 
pattern of Pacific tension is in Indochina. The Soviet Union 
realized that China needed to see some reduction in the 
Vietnamese threat before it could normalize relations with the 
Soviet Union. While China offered some concessions (such as 
accepting that the Soviet presence in Vietnamese bases was not 
an obstacle to Sino-Soviet detente), the Soviet Union has 
offered some compromises of its own. Moscow now discusses 
the question of Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea in talks 
with China and by 1987 China had even recognized that the 
Soviet were pressuring Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. 
In July 1987 Gorbachev made clear that he was sure that 
Vietnam would keep its promise to leave Kampuchea by 1990. 
The Soviet strategy aims to manage this withdrawal so that 
Kampuchea does not slip back into a Chinese sphere of 
influence and Vietnam does not force the Soviet Union to 
abandon its bases. This is a high-risk strategy, but the stakes 
involve improving relations with China and ASEAN and 
removing the stigma of responsibility for the Pacific's only 
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major continuing conflicts. Prince Sihanouk's overtures in 1988 
to the Vietnamese-backed Kampucheans were strongly 
supported by the USSR as a possible compromise 6 3 . Much like 
the search for a face-saving formula in Afghanistan, the Soviet 
Union has clearly been looking for ways to reduce its draining 
commitments to the developing world; however, much can still 
go wrong. 
Vietnam will hope to leave Kampuchea with a friendly 
regime in place and to maintain control through many of the 
same mechanisms of Party authority that the USSR exercises in 
Eastern Europe. If successful, Vietnam will have less need for 
Soviet support; the price for access to Vietnamese bases will 
therefore rise. The right to use the bases might even be 
eliminated if Vietnam opts for closer cooperation with non-
Communist Pacific states. Of course, the flaw in the scenario 
for Vietnamese independence is the threat from China. 
As the March 1988 clashes over the Spratly islands 
indicated, the Sino-Vietnamese dispute is not limited to 
Kampuchea. As long as China feels that Vietnam does not 
recognize China's leading role in East Asia and believes 
Vietnam to be impeding Chinese irredentism, then Beijing will 
continue its pressure. As worrying as this might be for the 
USSR, the continuation of tension does have its advantages. 
Vietnam will be less likely to request a Soviet withdrawal if 
it still feels a need for Soviet aid against China. The Soviet 
dilemma, as it knows only too well from its relationship with 
China and India, is how to convince China and Vietnam that it 
is evenhanded and sympathetic to both their positions. The first 
sign that the Soviet Union appreciated the complexity of the 
game was seen in its carefully constructed policy in the March 
1988 clash in the Spratlys. The Soviet Union avoided supporting 
Vietnamese claims but not so obviously as to drive Vietnam to 
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retaliate against Soviet interests 6 4 . Only the Soviet Union can 
provide Vietnam with military support sufficient to deter China 
and Moscow clearly declined to do so in March. If China 
persists in pressing its territorial claims, then the Soviet Union 
is likely to offer Vietnam only verbal support while allowing 
China to settle old scores. Of course, the Soviet Union will hope 
that China will not force Moscow's hand. 
Thus it seems unlikely that a genuine socialist Pacific 
community can be created. Moscow's ability to impose order in 
the Pacific is more limited than in Eastern Europe. In the Pacific, 
Communist states have gone to war against each other and will 
probably have tense relations in the future. Under these 
circumstances, the Soviet Union will have to choose among its 
fellow socialist states. China is the most important, but the 
most independent. Vietnam ranks next in importance but is the 
most antagonistic to China. While the Soviet Union will explore 
the possibili t ies of shaping a more coherent socialist 
community, it will probably settle for separate multilateral 
relations, often involving non-Communis t states. The 
northwest Pacific holds the best prospects for such cooperation. 
5. The Capitalist Pacific 
One of the main, though unstated, motives for Soviet 
pressure on its socialist allies to reform is the significantly better 
economic performance of their neighbours in the NICs and in 
part of ASEAN. The Soviet Union has realized that something 
important is happening in the Pacific's developing world, which 
holds prospects for improving the Soviet position in the region. 
The capitalist Pacific (apart from Japan and the United States) 
remains a diverse grouping and requires different Soviet 
strategies. For the most part, the Soviet Union is most 
interested in states closest to East Asia and less interested in the 
truly Pacific states. 
1° NICs and Proto-NICs 
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1° NICs and Proto-NICs 
The Soviet Union has never had a satisfactory relationship 
with many non-Communist developing states. Unlike the 
developed West, the Soviet Union trades little with these states 
and prefers to concentrate on a few specific partners such as 
India or Cuba. In the age of new international economic orders 
and the heyday of the nonaligned movement, the Soviet Union 
felt it understood the dependency between neo-colonialists and 
their former pupils in the South. But new thinking in the Soviet 
Union and new realities in the developing world have finally 
contributed to a more sophisticated Soviet view of the South. 
The emergence of the successful NICs in East Asia (Hong-
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) raises a variety of 
problems for the Soviet Union. All four are closely linked to the 
Western trading world and only Singapore has official ties with 
the Soviet Union. Yet all four are prime examples of the 
benefits of "thinking Pacific" and the possibilities for economic 
cooperation in the region. All four have sharply anti-socialist 
ideologies, all except Hong Kong have succeeded through a 
large degree of state direction and none has a democratic 
system as recognized by the developed Western states. The 
NICs and perhaps the proto-NICs of Malaysia and Thailand, 
are evidence that what is happening in East Asia requires new 
categories of thinking. As a pragmatic China has shown, it is 
possible to trade with all of these states, despite the occasional 
absence of diplomatic relations. 
While Soviet policy remains officially critical of all NICs, 
contacts have been opened with South Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong to explore trade possibilities 6 5. The political benefits 
the Soviet Union might derive from such ties are secondary and 
indeed the USSR risks complicating relations with North Korea 
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as it makes overtures to South Korea. The economic benefits of 
the Soviet relationship to the NICs are more evident. 
As Soviet policy toward ASEAN demonstrates the 
fundamental Soviet problem of finding goods to export to the 
developing Pacific states still remains. Raw materials continue 
to be the Soviet Union's staple export. While imports from 
Singapore and Malaysia have roughly approximated the level 
of Soviet trade, say with Turkey, the Soviet Union has found it 
virtually impossible to export. Possible new Soviet initiatives 
include machinery exports (for textiles, timber industry, 
fisheries) and gold sales to Asia through Singapore 6 6 . The 
development of economic relations depends on the conditions 
for investment by the NICs and for joint ventures in the Soviet 
Union and on finding Soviet products to export. Once again, it 
appears that raw materials or heavy industrial products, such 
as steel, will have to constitute the largest portion of Soviet 
exports. Yet as Canada and Australia already know, 
dependence on raw material exports is not desirable in an age 
when modern economies are moving into high technology and 
services. It is precisely because the Soviet Union recognizes the 
need to think in new categories about the Pacific that it has 
begun to consider structural compatibility with some of the 
NICs. South Korea is clearly the new favorite—with an 
economy and level of technology well suited to Soviet needs. 
Deals are being negotiated that would bring South Korean 
capital, technology and even labor to the Soviet Far East to 
establish a local manufacturing base. 
At the same time, the Soviet Union could obtain the far 
more intangible benefits of more normal political and military 
relations with the NICs and especially ASEAN. The stream of 
high-level delegations to and from Moscow beginning in 1987 is 
evidence of Soviet interest in and potential for playing a more 
positive role in the Paci f ic 6 7 . There has also been some 
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discussion of a new Soviet drive in heavy machinery exports to 
ASEAN, even to Malaysia, including military equipment 6 8 . 
Uncertainty about what tangible benefits can be derived from 
closer contacts with the Soviet Union remains a common 
refrain. Settling the conflicts in Korea and Indochina is the 
primary interest and in both cases there is confidence that the 
Soviet Union is beginning to deliver on promises of a more 
peaceful attitude. 
Assuming an improved political atmosphere and at least a 
modest upturn in economic relations, the Soviet Union could 
anticipate its more genuine acceptance as a Pacific power. 
Debates, such as those that divide ASEAN whenever Indonesia 
argues for better relations with Moscow, would then become 
less frequent. At some point, there appears to be a basic conflict 
between the possible cohesion of a putative Communist 
community in the Pacific and the Soviet desire for improved 
relations with the NICs and ASEAN. While the USSR desires a 
more peaceful atmosphere focused on the pursuit of domestic 
reform, there are few sound economic reasons for the Soviet 
Union to buy industrial goods from North Korea when it could 
buy better and less expensive items from some of the NICs. 
2° Across the Pacific 
The Soviet Union is more likely to think in terms of East 
Asia than the Pacific if only for reasons of geography. Trade 
with North America is easier across the Atlantic and trade with 
Latin America (especially Pacific Latin America), is negligible. 
Thus the Wider Pacific waters are only important as waterways 
to Australia and New Zealand where there are economic 
interests for the Soviet Union. Soviet imports from these South 
Pacific states are equal to those from Britain. But as with the 
ASEAN states, the problem for Moscow is its pathetic level of 
exports. Unlike some of the NICs or ASEAN, Australia and 
New Zealand have even less need for Soviet raw materials. 
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As close allies of the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand were also difficult to exploit politically. Unlike U.S. 
West European allies, there have been few carrots that Moscow 
can proffer and very few sticks that can be waved with any 
effect. The problems in ANZUS in the 1980s owe nothing to 
Soviet initiatives and all to the politics of New Zealand and its 
bilateral relations with the United States. 
The desire to make the South Pacific relatively free from the 
dangers of the nuclear age has offered the Soviet Union some 
room for exploitation. Although New Zealand has steadfastly 
refused to compensate for poor relations with Washington by 
approaches to Moscow, other South Pacific microstates have 
signed fishing agreements with the Soviet Union. The main 
motive has been financial, including American unwillingness to 
be more generous. The Soviet ability to wage diplomacy by 
fishing in troubled waters has been constrained by the local 
South Pacific states who have only s igned short-term 
agreements with restricted access for Soviet personnel. 
The Soviet Union did not renew its fishing arrangement 
with Kiribati for the same reason that it sought to do so with 
Vanuatu—the economics of the accord. But Papua New Guinea 
does attract more Soviet interest; offers to take Papuan 
students and develop mining technology or the fishing industry 
are all potentially useful tools of Soviet diplomacy 6 9 . But as a 
new observer in ASEAN, Papua New Guinea is searching for a 
new international role and thus is a relatively special case 
offering some prospects for Soviet foreign policy. 
The Soviet Union is also developing its maritime mining 
capability to extend its presence in the vast Pacific waters. A 
marine technology institute was opened in Vladivostok in 
March 1988 and the Soviet Union began to take advantage of 
its rights under the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
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the Sea (UNCLOS) to explore for minerals. Its designated 
territory between Hawaï and Central America is being explored 
for iron-manganese nodules with the hope of processing up to 
one million tons per year. Further talks have been held with 
other interested Pacific maritime nations, most notably 
M a l a y s i a 7 0 and Soviet success in exploitation of the mineral 
resources may well bring it new partners given the Pacific's 
focus on maritime issues. 
The Soviet Union is under no illusion that it can establish 
many beachheads in the "American lake". The signing of treaties 
on nuclear-free zones, such as the Raratonga agreement in the 
South Pacific, will win some friends in the region and 
undoubtedly antagonize the Western powers, but the Pacific 
beyond the coast of East Asia is not a zone of Soviet priority. 
C.THE SOVIET UNION'S PACIFIC IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
Even if the scenario described in the introduction comes to 
pass, from the Soviet point of view there will still be much that 
is unsatisfactory about the Pacific Century. First, even if the 
Soviet economy is booming, it is still likely to be smaller than 
Japan's and will be, at best, a medium-sized Pacific economy. 
With a sparse population and dependence on raw material 
exports, the Soviet economy will be as unbalanced as Japan's 
(albeit a mirror image). 
Second, even if the United States is a declining superpower, 
it will remain more important to more Pacific states than the 
Soviet Union. U.S. security commitments will extend across the 
Pacific to the coast of East Asia and U.S. trade relations will 
weave closer webs of interdependence throughout the Pacific. 
The United States will focus on the Pacific, while the Soviet 
Union will focus on East Asia. 
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Third, even if China is now more friendly to the Soviet 
Union than at any time in the past 30 years, China and the 
Soviet Union will continue to perceive each other as potentially 
major threats. Cooperation will increase, but competition will 
remain. The two social systems will survive as distinctly 
different varieties of Communism. 
Fourth, even if Japan does become a major investor in 
Soviet Pacific territory and a major trade partner, it will remain 
primarily tied to the global market economy. Even if Japan 
grows more independent, it will always remain suspicious of 
the Soviet Union and will continue to perceive Soviet military 
power as a major threat. 
Fifth, even if a greater spirit of community can be built 
among the Communist states of the Pacific, there will be severe 
limits to cooperation. These Pacific Communist states will also 
remain poorer than their non-Communist neighbours and 
therefore will continue to be a drain on the Soviet Union. 
Finally, even if the non-Communist states in the Pacific 
establish closer political and economic ties with the Soviet 
Union, few will find the Soviet Union a replacement for their 
basic orientation to the Western camp. Although they will be 
more pragmatic and often diverse in their dealings with the 
Soviet Union, the USSR will have little reason or opportunity 
to establish close relations with the poorer of these states or the 
wealthier ones such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
Yet these obvious difficulties should not create undue 
pessimism about the Soviet role in the Pacific. Many of these 
reforms are already underway and if only half of the planned 
changes occur, the impact on the region will be profound. In 
many respects, the Soviet position in 1989 is better than at any 
stage since the end of the Second World War. The 
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transformation of the Soviet Union into a more genuine power 
in the Pacific will also make it more normal, but whether 
normal also means more peaceful, depends to a large degree on 
the policies of the other states in the region. There is some 
prospect that a Soviet Union less concerned about military force 
in the Pacific and possessing a modest but effective economic 
role, will become an Australia with nuclear weapons. The 
USSR seems to have recognized that its past strategies 
regarding the Pacific have been inappropriate and that the 
region cannot be manipulated by the Soviet Union. The Pacific 
states may also have begun to realize this. Yet if they are 
seriously considering greater cooperation in the twenty-first 
century, it cannot be accomplished without assigning a major 
role to the Soviet Union. 
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RESUME 
La nouvelle orientation prise par l 'URSS à l'égard de la 
région de l'Asie Pacifique, due principalement au retard 
croissant de l'Extrême-Orient soviétique, est antérieure au 
discours prononcé à Vladivostok en juillet 1986 par M. Michel 
Gorbatchev. 
Pour atteindre son objectif, soit participer pleinement à 
toutes les organisations du bassin du Pacifique, l'URSS cherche 
à minimiser l'influence des Etats-Unis dans la région et à 
exploiter les convergences d'intérêts avec la République 
populaire de Chine; elle traitera désormais le Japon sur un pied 
d'égalité et incitera les Etats socialistes qui lui sont alliés à plus 
de rigueur économique. 
En As ie or ienta le , l 'URSS compte développer la 
coopération et les échanges avec les économies nouvellement 
industrialisées mais dans la zone plus large de l'Océan Pacifique 
tout entier, l 'URSS ne recherche pas vraiment à affirmer sa 
présence. Les matières premières qui constituent ses seuls 
produits exportables ne trouvent pas preneurs et les Etats du 
Pacifique ne se prêtent guère à une exploitation politique; la 
seule exception possible étant la Nouvelle-Guinée-Papouasie 
en quête d'un rôle international. 
Même si les réformes soviétiques étaient couronnées de 
succès rapides, l'Union Soviétique sera toujours au 21ème siècle 
une économie moins développée que celle des voisins à 
économie de marché; tout au plus pourra-t-elle représenter 
l'équivalent d'une Australie mais dotée d'engins nucléaires. Elle 
ne pourra en aucun cas remplacer les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés 
dans la région. 
